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The future of finance
The financial crash of 2008-9 has been the most
damaging economic event since the Great Depression,
affecting the lives of hundreds of millions of people. The
most immediate problem now is to prevent a repeat
performance. 
The central question is what the financial system is for?
Standard texts list five main functions: channelling savings
into real investment; transferring risk; maturity
transformation (including smoothing of lifecycle
consumption); effecting payments; and making markets.
But looking at how financial companies make their
money, it is extraordinarily difficult to see how closely this
corresponds to the stated functions, and it is often
difficult to explain why the rewards can be so high. Any
explanation must also explain why the system is so prone
to boom and bust.
The opening chapters of the LSE
report (by Adair Turner, Andrew
Haldane and Paul Woolley) deal with
these fundamental issues: the ideal
functions of the system; the way the
system has actually operated; and
the sources of boom and bust. To
answer these questions, much of the
abstract theory of finance has to be
abandoned in favour of a more
realistic model of how the different
agents actually behave.
Central to this is opacity and
asymmetric information, combined
with short-term performance-related
pay. For example, the asset price
momentum that accompanies
booms occurs because the owners of giant funds expect
fund managers to shift into the fastest rising stocks. (They
would do better to invest on a longer-term basis.)
The opacity of the system has increased enormously with
the growth of derivatives. Did this contribute to high long-
term growth? The issue remains open. On one side,
people point to the high real growth during the period
1950-73 (an era of financial repression) and the real cost
of the present downturn. On the other side, many studies,
discussed in the report by Sushil Wadhwani, point to real
benefits from financial deepening. But apart from his
chapter, all other contributors invoke the need for a
radically simplified and slimmer financial system.
There are four aims of such a reform. The first is to
prevent the financial system destabilising the real
economy, as it has in the recent
past. The second (closely related) is
to protect taxpayers against the
possible cost of bailouts. The third is
to reduce the share of real national
income that accrues as income to
the financial sector and its
employees for reasons not related to
the benefits it confers – thus
absorbing into the sector talent that
could be more usefully used
elsewhere. And all of this has to be
done in a way that works.
There are two main lines of
approach. The first is regulation –
higher capitalisation of all financial
institutions, and levels of required
capital that rise in a boom and fall
What is a financial system for? That is the starting point for the LSE’s
recent report on reform of the world’s financial system, which brings
together the work of leading academics, financiers, journalists and
officials from the UK’s Financial Services Authority, the Bank of
England and the Treasury.
The financial system has become far
more complicated than it needs to be 
to discharge its functions – and
dangerously unstable into the bargain
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in a slump. In the report, Charles Goodhart points to
some of the difficulties involved in any such regulation;
Andrew Smithers shows that asset price booms can be
identified, at least sometimes; and Andrew Large discusses
how such information could be used, if there were an
independent committee specifically charged with
‘macroprudential regulation’. (Sushil Wadhwani argues by
contrast that financial booms should be mainly controlled
via interest rates.)
The second main approach to a more stable system is
institutional reform. John Kay argues strongly for the
introduction of narrow banking. In such a system, only
deposit-taking institutions could expect to be insured
through the state, and they would not be allowed to build 
up a balance sheet of risky assets. This is a version of the
so-called Volcker Rule.
Faced with these two possible lines of approach, Martin
Wolf comes down in favour of strong regulation, linked
perhaps to some institutional reform, aimed especially at
greater competition. He argues that the state would in
fact bail out any major financial institution threatened
with bankruptcy, whether deposit-taking or not; it must
therefore regulate all institutions. 
Moreover managers must face totally different incentives
and pay. In particular, Wolf suggests the managers should
be liable to repay a substantial proportion of their pay if
their institution requires state assistance or goes bankrupt
within ten years of their getting that pay.
All these proposals would directly reduce the profitability
of banks and the pay of bankers. Do they have a chance?
In the final chapter of the report, Peter Boone and Simon
Johnson document the huge influence that banks exert in
the political sphere worldwide. They argue that only a
worldwide system of regulation embodied in a global
body, comparable to the World Trade Organization, could
have a chance.
In this context, it is encouraging that the Working Party of
the G20 Financial Stability Board, which will deliver
proposals to the G20 Summit this November, is chaired by
the author of the report’s opening chapter, Adair Turner.
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